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Book-building is commonly adopted in global primary markets and regarded as 
the most efficient pricing method for accurate IPO pricing by literatures. China has 
introduced book-building in 2005 to increase IPO pricing accuracy and the capabilities of 
domestic institutional investors. However, with the current IPO data from China, I find 
the level of under-pricing has unexpectedly increased after book-building, which is 
against the empirical studies of a few domestic papers. Secondly, there’s some evidence 
that with better information disclosure from issuer-side through book-building process, 
the signaling and ex-ante uncertainty effect that previously caused under-pricing has been 
reduced. But there’re unique findings on both Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
due to the bull market effect, the launch of SME Board and the removal of IPO 
suspension after mid-2006. Last but not least, large number of institutional investors 
involved in book-building is likely to be regarded as a signal for herding behavior on 
China’s secondary market and based on the information collected from book-building, 
underwriters tend to over-adjust final offer price.  
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  iiHas the Introduction of Book-building Increased the Efficiency of 
China’s IPO Pricing? 
1  Introduction 
Initial Public Offerings (“IPO”s) are marketed and priced with different methods in 
different countries. Ritter (2002) summarized that generally there are three types of IPO 
pricing methods adopted by new issuers globally: auction, fixed-price and book-building. 
Before 1990, fixed-price methods were commonly adopted by non-U.S. countries. But 
after trial and error, book-building gradually become dominant in the last two decades. 
According to Ljungqvist, Jenkinson and Wilhem (2003), by July 1999, about 80% of 
non-U.S. offerings were brought to market using book-building method or its hybrids.  
Book-building is conducted in the way that the underwriter organizes a price 
consultation meeting or “road show” where potential institutional buyers are invited to 
bid at their favorite prices and volumes for new issues, meanwhile the underwriter keeps 
a “book” of the information collected from the above processes, and sets the ultimate 
offer price based on the “book” just been built.  
Book-building method is considered superior to auction and fixed-price methods in 
terms of information gathering and pricing accuracy. The “secret” behind is that with 
book building, the underwriter has full control over share allocation and is likely to base 
the allocation on either the level of information revealed by institutional investors 
[Cornelli and Goldreich (2001)] or the long-term relationship between investor and 
underwriter [Sherman (2000)].   
In China, despite frequent changes in IPO pricing regulation, pricing methods before 
2005 were pretty close to fixed-price. In 2005, “The Notice of Trial on Book-building 
Pricing Mechanism for China’s Initial Public Offerings” (“The Notice”)— a milestone 
document issued by  China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) officially took 
effect. The Notice regulated that new IPOs on China’s A-stock market be priced by 
conducting book-building process, where qualified institutional investors are invited to 
consult on appropriate IPO price. The issuing of the Notice is aimed to 1) produce more 
accurate offer price and resolve the high under-pricing problem most IPOs on China’s A-
  1stock market will suffer on the first trading day; 2) get more institutional investors 
involved in pricing process and to elevate their pricing abilities. 
This paper, therefore, attempts to find out whether the expectations of introducing 
book-building method have been achieved and whether book-building has made 
significant changes on China’s IPO market. In detail, the paper will explore the answers 
to the following questions: 1) whether the introduction of book-building has significantly 
lowered under-pricing in both Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange; 2) whether the 
information asymmetry theories that are commonly considered to explain for under-
pricing on China’s primary equity market become less significant  after the introduction 
of book-building; 3) what is the information contained in China’s book-building process, 
especially the preliminary book-building session where the offer price range and size are 
first set and whether such information has significantly lowered under-pricing;.  
To answer these questions, this paper used a sample of 483 IPOs listed on Shanghai 
and Shenzhen A-stock market from 2001-2007, among which 187 are IPOs after 2005—
the post book-building regulation period. Regression models are conducted to analyze the 
proxies for factors that are considered significant for under-pricing and compare the 
result before and after book-building. One of the major contributions of this paper is that 
the dataset used to compose the variables in the model are mostly hand-collected from 
either prospectuses or stock-exchange websites and are not readily available in publicly 
accessible database.  
This paper extended the theories from past literatures, which propose book-building 
as an efficient pricing method, by applying them to specific data from China market. 
Sherman (2000), Sherman (2005), and Benveniste and Busaba (1997) are the 
representative among them providing explanations for the mechanisms behind book-
building regarding how it has affected under-pricing. Ljungqvist, Jenkinson and Wilhelm 
(2003) adopted regression models to compare the direct and indirect costs of book-
building and fixed-price on non-US IPOs, and reached the conclusion that book-building, 
though more expensive, produce far less under-pricing. But with samples overseas, these 
theories or empirical models cannot be simply applied to China’s IPOs.  
Earlier domestic papers, however, focused on explaining under-pricing problem on 
China’s IPO market and testing established theories such as signaling, winner’s curse, 
  2information cascade etc. Since 2005, China’s domestic scholars started to conduct studies 
and discussions on the effect of this new book-building regulation— “the Notice”. There 
are positive results supporting the idea that book-building has increased China’s IPO 
pricing accuracy [(Wang, He and Zhang (2006), Tian and Wang (2007), Yang and Zhao 
(2006)]. However, given the time of publishing, these studies are only able to include a 
small sample (about only 15 observations) and therefore the empirical results are not very 
convincing.  
In Section 2, I briefly review the revolution of IPO pricing methods in China, discuss 
the rationale behind the introduction of book-building mechanism and summarize its 
major contents. In Section 3, I summarize the literature theories on the effectiveness of 
book-building and based on them, derive the hypothesis needed to be tested for China’s 
IPOs. The introduction of data is in Section 4 and I will have analysis on the under-
pricing before and after book-building method is introduced and the characteristics of the 
data.  
2  A Review of Pricing Mechanism in China’s A-stock IPO Market 
2.1  The history of China’s A-stock IPO pricing regulations 
China’s IPO pricing regulations have gone through drastic changes in the past. 
Before Dec.1996, IPO prices were fixed at 15 times of forecasted earnings per share. 
However, the earnings forecast was very subjective, and therefore there was large 
casualty in pricing.  From Jan.1997, the earnings per share used in P/E ratio were 
changed to the arithmetic average of the past three years’ earnings per share. However 
opponents held that this method didn’t correctly reflect the market demand and in 
Mar.1998, historical earnings per share in P/E ratio was changed back to forecast 
earnings and the P/E ratio was still fixed at 15.  
In Mar. 1999, the pricing method was open to market, so called “book-building”. 
Nevertheless, only the offer price at that time was open for consultation, while the issue 
size was still under the “Quota System” by CSRC.  So the market reform of IPO pricing 
was very limited. At the same time, the newly reformed IPO P/E ratios become extremely 
high, some as high as 40. It was obvious that when the “Quota System” was applied in 
IPO market, huge demand for new issues had not been matched, causing the IPO’s initial 
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return of 178% with a sample of 507 A-shares from 1993 to 1998, and Chi and Padgett 
(2005) measured a market-adjusted initial return of 129.16% with 668 A-shares from 
Jan.1
st, 1996 to Dec.31
st, 2000. Also, there was no incentive for underwriters to bid for a 
competitively higher offering price as the issue size was restrictedly controlled.   
In 2001, the “Quota System” was finally transformed into “Sanction System”, under 
which underwriters could recommend new issuers to CSRC for approval [(Liu Ti (2003)] 
and the issue size was no longer restricted. The IPO pricing method was then changed 
again to “book-building”. Unfortunately, the offer price was upper-limited to a P/E ratio 
of 20. Therefore the market-oriented change was still limited and such pricing method 
was almost equal to fixed-offer method as most IPOs were issued at their P/E ratio 
ceiling of 20.  
It was not until 2005 when the landmark book-building pricing regulation took 
effect that the real market reform of IPO in China started.  
2.2  The background of introducing book-building method 
The experiences in mature primary markets show that consulting IPO prices from 
institutional investors who are experts in securities analysis and valuation is the most 
efficient way for setting IPO prices. Besides, in China, institutional investors represented 
by mutual funds are developing fast and they are more capable and willing to be involved 
in IPO pricing. China’s Securities Regulatory Committee decided it was time to push 
forward the market-oriented revolution of China’s IPO market, beginning with the reform 
on IPO pricing mechanism. “The Notice of the Trial of Book-building Pricing 
Mechanism on China’s Initial Public Offerings” (“The Notice”) was issued in such 
backgrounds.  
The Notice has revolutionary meaning in the development of China’s securities 
market. First, by introducing book-building, combining the opinions from issuer, 
underwriter and investor, IPO pricing becomes less subjective and arbitrary. With the 
public disclosure of the pricing process, both the investor and underwriter are under 
market’s supervision, which creates a long-term value investment environment. Secondly, 
it benefits the institutional investors by giving them more power in IPO pricing, which 
  4motivates more diversified capital flowing into primary market, such as trust-investment 
companies, treasury companies, insurances and pension funds. Thirdly, book-building 
demands for high standards from the underwriter, from internal management, research, 
clientele resources, sales channel to IPO pricing and marketing abilities and in the long-
run, is helpful in improving the competitiveness of China’s underwriter force.   
    
2.3  How does China’s book-building process work?  
In U.S. and many other countries, the book-building effort follows the registration for 
IPO and filing of the preliminary prospectus with the security regulatory committee. The 
preliminary prospectus represents the outcome of investment banker's due diligence 
effort. After the committee has commented on the registration statement and the 
preliminary prospectus has been circulated among potential investors, the issuing firm's 
investment bank organizes a series of road shows designed to generate interest among 
potential investors. Based on these presentations and the information in the prospectus, 
including a suggested price range for the offering, participants are asked to provide 
nonbinding indications of interest in the issue.  The "book" is built from these 
expressions of demand and based on the information in the book, the terms of the 
offering are finalized shortly before distribution begins [Benveniste and Wilhem (1997)].  
The book-building process in China is quite similar to the U.S. version, except that it 
contains two sessions, the preliminary book-building session and road show session. The 
issuer and “IPO Sponsor”, usually the same as underwriter first file for registration to the 
China Securities Regulatory Committee (CSRC) and hand in due diligence report. Once 
the registration gets approved by CSRC, the report will be delivered to institutions who 
will participate in preliminary book-building (the “Notice”). These institutions are 
selected by the investment bank from all qualified institutional bidders, no less than 20, 
and should fall in the qualifications regulated by CSRC. During the preliminary book-
building, the price consultation is conducted and the offer price range is settled based on 
consultation result. The underwriter then organizes road show campaigns, discloses the 
price range and accumulates bidding volumes from all qualified institutions within the 
price range, and finally sets the offer price according to the demand. The underwriter will 
  5then allocate the shares according the bid size
1. After book-building, the rest of stocks 
will be allocated to public investors online at a uniform price, which is normally the offer 
price. [Wang, He and Zhang (2006)] The stocks allocated to applicants in book-building 
session will be locked up to 3 months (the “Notice”). So strictly speaking, the new 
pricing method in China’s A-stock IPO market is book building/fixed-price hybrid based 
on the definition by Sherman (2000). 
3  Literature Review and Hypotheses 
3.1  The relationship of book-building and under-pricing 
Short-term under-pricing of IPO, usually defined as the increase in the first-trading 
day closing price from the offer price, is commonly observed in almost all primary 
markets around the world. Ritter (2002) studied the under-pricing of 38 countries in the 
past two decades and found that on average, the closing market price on the first day of 
trading of an IPO is higher than the offer price.  
There are a lot of different explanations for under-pricing. Many are based on the 
information asymmetry between IPO firm and investors. One of the most phenomenal is 
the signaling theory that high-quality firms often discount on their IPO price as signal of 
confidence in the firm’s sustainable profitability. Another commonly discussed 
explanation is the winners’ curse theory that investors are assumed to hold different level 
of information about the issuing firm and thus retail investors are often in disadvantage in 
share allocation. In order to secure the active participation of retail investors, IPO firms 
will under-price more to compensate for those less-informed investors. 
Among all the alternative explanations, the choice of pricing method is also 
frequently discussed and proved to be helpful in understanding under-pricing, because 
different pricing methods do cause different level of under-pricing according to some 
scholars. Many literatures have compared under-pricing of IPOs using fixed-price, 
auction and book-building pricing methods and found that book-building methods 
produce lower under-pricing. 
                                                 
1 According to “the Notice”, the number of shares allocated to institutions participating in book-building 
shall not exceed 20% of the total IPO size, if the IPO size is less than 400 million shares; and shall not  
exceed 50%, if the IPO size is more than 400 million and including. 
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its advantage in information collection and the full discretion of share allocation by 
underwriters. Although in auction, IPO pricing and allocation is also based on market 
demand information, it fails to put the power of the investment banker's relationships 
with potential investors to work for the issuing firm and therefore is generally inefficient 
[Sherman (2000)].  
But why the information advantage and discretion of allocation of book-building will 
lead to lower under-pricing?  
Benveniste and Wilhelm (1997) explained this from the information-revealing point 
of view. They observed that investors have “soft” information, which is their level of 
demand for the new issue. By building an “order book” through road show, issuers and 
their underwriters are able to collect the true revelation of IPO valuation from investors. 
While the incentives of such honesty come from the underwriters’ ability to allocate 
shares to their favorable investors who they consider have contributed most in 
information revealing. For investors, it’s the balance between the cost of a higher offer 
price and favorable share allocation, and normally the latter provides larger benefits.  
Sherman (2000) emphasizes on the importance of the long-term relationship between 
underwriter and investors in book-building, which can be utilized in repeated IPO 
settings to reduce under-pricing. Discretion in share allocation in book-building allows 
underwriter to form regular investor groups that will participate in every offering. Such 
long-term relationship allow the underwriter to lower average under-pricing while still 
giving investors the incentive to gather and report the optimal level of information. 
Therefore, underwriters and investors achieve mutual benefits. Other issue methods such 
as auctions do not allow long term relationship between underwriter and investors, as the 
allocation mechanism behind them is non-discretionary.  
Whether it is because favorable share allocation or long-term benefit to lure investors 
to reveal true demand interest, book-building pricing is widely considered to have 
lowered under-pricing due to its information-collection nature. The effect should also be 
observed in China’s IPO market if the book-building mechanism in China is well 
implemented. Yang and Zhao (2006) observed a 48.38% market-adjusted return on IPO 
  7first-trading day with 15 samples since 2005. The similar result, about 45% market-
adjusted initial return, was observed by Wang, He and Zhang (2006).  
 
Hypothesis 1: Book-building has efficiently lowered under-pricing. On both Shanghai 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, the under-pricing after 2005 will be significantly 
lower than under-pricing before 2005.  
3.2  Book-building and Information Advantage of Issuing Firms 
Ritter and Welch (2002), Benveniste and Spindt (1989) both identified that there are 
two kinds of information asymmetries existing between IPO issuer and investors: 1) 
issuing firms are more informed about their own business situation than investors and 2) 
investors are more informed about factors outside firm than issuers, for example superior 
information about competitors and market demand information. Hypothesis 1 actually 
talks about the second type of information asymmetry, the information advantage of 
investors. The next two hypotheses will be based on the first type of information 
asymmetry that issuing firms possess inside information over investors.  
 
If issuers hold more inside information, a lemons problem may appear that investors 
cannot tell the good IPOs from bad. In order to distinguish themselves, high-quality firms 
attempt to signal by discounting more on the offer price, known as the “Signaling 
Theory”. Investors then will benefit from price appreciation in secondary market. Under-
pricing then becomes a cost that low-quality IPOs cannot afford to imitate. [Welch (1989)] 
 
However, with book-building, such information asymmetry should be reduced. 
During preliminary book-building, investors invited will receive due diligence report on 
IPO firm, which will contain more information regarding firm quality. While before 
book-building, such information is not available. Therefore, high-quality firms which 
intend to send a signal to investors by under-pricing will find this approach less effective 
after book-building is introduced.  
 
  8Hypothesis 2: Signaling effect on under-pricing decreased after book-building and 
firm quality proxies significant in explaining under-pricing before book-building 
become less significance after book-building. 
 
Rock (1986), Beatty and Ritter (1986) discussed about the “winner’s curse” problem 
associated with IPOs, that the privileged investors will crowd out the disadvantaged 
investors when IPOs are offered at their expected value, and withdraw from the market 
when bad issues are offered. Such “winners’ curse” problem intensifies especially when 
investors have ex ante uncertainty regarding the IPO value. In order to guarantee that 
uninformed investors also participate in IPO market, underwriters have to discount more 
on the offer price to provide uninformed investors with a reasonable return as 
compensation for taking the risk of issuer uncertainty and disadvantage share allocation.  
Beatty and Ritter (1986) used a sample of 545 IPOs registered with SEC from April, 
1981 to December, 1982 to test the ex-ante uncertainty proposition with the proxy of 1) 
number of uses of proceeds disclosed in prospectus and 2) reciprocal of gross proceeds, 
and found that there’s a significant positive relationship between under-pricing and IPO 
proceeds, which supported the ex-ante uncertainty explanation for under-pricing. 
Moreover, Su (2003) conducted similar empirical test with 587 IPOs from China 
between January 1994 and December 1999, with more proxies used for ex-ante 
uncertainty. He found that under-pricing is closely related to the size of offerings, inside 
ownership, disclosure practices, market conditions and allocation mechanism. Therefore, 
according to Su, ex-ante uncertainty theory also applies to China’s IPOs in the time 
period when book-building is not adopted.  
However, once book-building mechanism is introduced, through thorough due 
diligence process before filing registration with CSRC for IPO offering and two rounds 
of marketing campaign, issuers disclose more information to investors, and the 
speculative risks associated with the IPOs are supposed to be reduced. Though the 
winners’ curse problem may still exist, especially among retail investors, compared to 
pre-book-building period when only the underwriter and issuer hold the authority of 
pricing, more institutional investors get involved in the pricing process, the winners’ 
curse problem should have eased.  
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Hypothesis 3: Ex-ante uncertainty effect on under-pricing decreased after book-
building and the ex-ante uncertainty proxies significant in explaining under-pricing 
before book-building become less significant after book-building.  
3.3  Information Value of Book-building and Under-pricing 
The book-building process contains valuable information. For example, the number 
of institutional investors, on one hand, reflects the level of market demand; on the other 
hand, indicates more accurate IPO pricing and better information collection. Some other 
form of information includes: the price range settled in preliminary book-building, the 
final price adjustment from expected offer price, which is the arithmetic average of the 
high and low end of price range and the final offer size adjustment from the amount 
disclosed in book-building.  
As discussed in Section 2.2, institutional investors are normally considered to have 
the expertise and resources to come up with more accurate IPO price. One of the reasons 
of introducing book-building by CSRC is to utilize the strengths of institutional investors 
and increase the pricing efficiency of China’s IPO, at the mean time increase the pricing 
abilities of China’s developing domestic institutional investors. The more institutional 
investors involved in pricing process of IPOs, the more information they will bring to 
book-building process. Therefore, the under-pricing should be reduced due to more 
accurate pricing and better information revealed.  
The magnitude of price range, which is determined in preliminary book-building also 
helps observe the accuracy of pricing. Large price range show that there is large 
discrepancies among institutional investors on the offer price. Therefore, larger price 
range relates to larger under-pricing.  
 
Hypothesis 4: More institutional investors participating in IPO pricing process result 
in lower under-pricing; the magnitude of price range settled in preliminary book-
building is positively associated with under-pricing. 
 104  Data and Description 
4.1  The Sample 
The sample used in this paper is comprised of 483 companies that issued A-shares 
and listed on either Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchange, during the period from 1 
January 2001 to 31 December 2007. The sample is selected from Tsinghua University 
China Center for Financial Research and is further divided into two periods for empirical 
analysis and comparison by the year when book-building pricing method was introduced: 
the pre-book-building period (2001-2004) and the post-book-building period (2005-2007).  
Such time periods are chosen because in 2001, the long-time dominant “Quota 
System” for selecting new IPOs each year has been transformed into “Sanction System”, 
under which underwriters are able to  recommend new issues to CSRC for approval [(Liu 
Ti (2003)] and there’s no quota limits for the number and volume of IPOs each year. 
Therefore, the year 2001 is recognized as the beginning of market-oriented reform on 
China’s IPO market. On Jan.1 2005, book-building pricing method officially took effect, 
allowing pricing of IPOs on China’s A-stock market open to market forces.  
Table [1] summarizes the number of IPOs in the sample from 2001 to 2007 on an 
annual basis and reveals some interesting results. Before book-building was introduced, 
from 2001 to 2004, Shanghai Stock Exchange on average had 64 IPOs each year and 
totally took up 86.82% of all IPOs listed on both stock exchanges during that period. This 
is because IPO listing was suspended on Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2001. It was not 
until 2004 that the suspension was removed and the Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 
(SME) Board was launched on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The SME Board is 
designed as an exclusive market segment for small- and mid-caps with pronounced core 
business, high growth potential and intensive technological contents
2.  
IPO listing was challenged again from mid-2005 to mid-2006, when IPOs on both 
stock exchanges were suspended to pave the way for the Non-Outstanding Stock Reform. 
So there are only 15 IPOs in the sample on both stock exchanges in 2005. With the re-
opening of IPO market in mid-2006, the number of IPOs increased dramatically year on 
year. Interestingly, about 81% of IPOs post-book-building period chose to list on the 
                                                 
2 Source: Shenzhen Stock Exchange website 
 11Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The reason is probably because the majority if IPOs in that 
period were small and mid-caps, and SME Board on Shenzhen Stock Exchange have 
lower entry requirements and more customized systems.  
However, through the entire sample period from 2001-2007, Shanghai Stock 
Exchange still has 50% more IPOs than Shenzhen Stock Exchange, because in the four 
years pre-book-building period, there were a lot many IPOs in Shanghai.  
4.2  Under-pricing before and after book-building  
A number of papers have studied the under-pricing problem in China’s IPO market 
since the stock market opening in 1990s. Extreme high under-pricing in early age of 
China’s equity market is often quoted and studied as an emerging-market phenomenon by 
a lot of scholars. In Ritter (2002)’s 38-country under-pricing table, average initial returns 
in China from 1990-2000 is the highest, 256.9%. Table [2] summarizes the results of 
empirical studies on China IPOs’ initial returns and market-adjusted initial returns. 
Under-pricing on B-stock market is generally lower than A-stock market IPOs, around 
25% on average. However, under-pricing on A-stock market varies with different time 
period. Under-pricing before 1990 was extremely high, that’s why dataset including early 
years of IPOs will have dramatically high initial return, such as Su and Fleisher (1999) 
and Gu (2003). With time progressing, the average initial until 2000 is about 130%. Most 
recent studies, especially with data after 2005, show even lower under-pricing, less than 
100%.  
In this paper, I calculated both initial return and market-adjusted initial return of the 
sample. But I use only market-adjusted initial return as dependent variable in empirical 
study, because it keeps away the influence of market conditions and therefore is more 
accurate for detecting the efficiency of IPO pricing.  
The following is the detailed formula for under-pricing measurement: 
 
Initial Return (IR) (%) =
1
0
PP
P
− 0 *100 
Market-adjusted Return (MAR) (%) =
11
00
[ ]*100
PM
PM
−   
 120 P : IPO offer price;  
1 P : IPO first-trading day closing price;  
0 M : Market index closing price on the day of IPO offering;  
1 M : Market index closing price on the day of IPO listing (i.e.IPO first-trading-day).  
 
Table [3] summarizes the average under-pricing of sample IPOs on both stock 
exchanges from 2001-2007 on an annual basis. I find that there’s not much difference 
between initial return and market-adjusted initial return. This is because the percentage 
change of market index within a few days is very small. So the analytical results by using 
market-adjusted initial return will not show much difference from results using initial 
return. Such uniformity of IR and MAR can also be observed from Figure [1].  
In pre-book-building period, the average under-pricing in Shanghai Stock Exchange 
measured in initial return is 103.09%, while the average under-pricing post book-building 
has been decreased to 77.59%, and the overall average under-pricing on Shanghai Stock 
Exchange is 100.04%. For under-pricing on Shanghai Stock Exchange, there are two 
turning points throughout the whole sample period, which can also be observed from 
Figure [1] (a). The under-pricing has drastic changes before and after both 2002 and 2006. 
2006 is when more IPOs started to list on Shang Stock Exchange since book-building 
regulation took effect. The under-pricing decreased dramatically to only 37.90%. 
However, it picked up again in 2007 to 105.20%. This is probably because in 2007, many 
blue-chip IPOs such as large domestic commercial banks and key-industry State-Owned 
Enterprises (SOE) got listed on SHSE. They received overwhelming market demand on 
secondary market.  
The under-pricing on Shenzhen Stock Exchange is another story. Before book-
building, the average initial return is only 68.28%. However, it increased to 159.27% 
after book-building. Especially in 2007, the under-pricing on average is amazingly as 
high as 212.14%. Actually, the maximum initial return in 2007 on Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange was even more than 500%. From Figure [1] (b), we can see that 2005— the 
year of book-building regulation is the turning point, and there’s steep increase 
afterwards. This is probably because most IPOs on Shenzhen Stock Exchange post book-
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risk. Therefore their offer price is purposefully set lower, on one hand, to guarantee a 
successful IPO, and on another, to compensate investors for taking high risks.  
In conclusion, it’s not a good sign to see dramatic increase in under-pricing in 2007 
on both stock exchanges, as the first-trading day initial return is supposed to decrease 
with the introduction of book-building. Later in this paper, I will further analyze the 
effect of book-building on statistical significance basis.  
4.3  The Independent Variables 
Historical literatures on China’s IPO under-pricing have provided empirical 
evidences for some explanations of under-pricing. In Section 3, I summarized two 
representative theories commonly studies on China’s data: the signaling effect of high-
quality firms [Welch (1989)] and the ex-ante uncertainty of IPO firm value due to limited 
information disclosure [Beatty and Ritter (1986)].  
In the signaling theory, equity retained by the Government or State-owned companies 
(STATOWN)
3 is often used as proxy for firm quality. Su (2004) considered equity 
retention as signal of improved earnings. Mok and Hui (1998) argued that in emerging 
market with high information asymmetry, the high equity retention is normally 
interpreted by investors as a business guarantee and thus high firm quality. Su (2004) and 
Chen et al (2004) observed significantly positive relation between Government’s equity 
retention and under-pricing. Besides, I also put controlling stock-ownership 
(CONTROWN) to proxy firm quality in the regression model, because the higher 
percentage of controlling stockholders’ ownership in the firm, they will have stronger 
incentive to monitor the firm to deliver better profits. In the long-run, high-quality firms 
will outperform low-quality firms in the aftermarket stock performance. So I used the 
IPO’s cumulative stock return after one-year of offering (LGTMPERF) as proxy for firm 
quality. The rest independent variables for firm quality include historical earnings per 
share (EPS), return on equity (ROE) and compounded annual growth rate of net income 
(NICAGR). All these are fundamental factors that reflect firms’ profitability or return to 
investors.  
                                                 
3 The bold characteristics in brackets are variables used in this paper, the detailed description of which is in 
Appendix 1.   
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proceeds (IPOSIZE) has significant effect on book-building. Su and Fleisher (2004), Su 
(2004), Chi and Padgett (2004), Mok and Hui (1998) as well as Chen at al (2004) 
observed significantly positive effect. IPO offer size is generally used as proxy for 
uncertainty of the firm value. IPOs of larger size are considered to have lower risk. 
Besides, Su (2004) used debt-to-total assets ratio (DE) and the age of firm (AGE) as 
proxies for uncertainty. He argued that a high pre-IPO leverage ratio raises uncertainty 
about the financial strength of a firm because debt financing imposes a hard budget 
constraint on management. Besides, old firms have lower risk than new firms. I also put 
P/E ratio (PE) as proxy for firm uncertainty, because high P/E reflects high growth rate 
and thus high risk of a firm. So a positive impact of P/E on under-pricing is expected.  
Besides variables proxy the above two theories, some variables have also been 
commonly regarded as significant in explaining under-pricing, thus I added as control 
variables in the model.  
Mok and Hui (1998) found out that a long time-lag between IPO offering and listing 
(TIMELAG) is one of the key determinants of under-pricing. Su (2004) used cumulative 
daily returns of Shanghai/Shenzhen stock exchanges index 30-trading days before an IPO 
as proxy for market condition surrounding a new issue, and found significantly positive 
relationship with under-pricing. Chi and Padgett (2005) argued that one important reason 
for high under-pricing of IPOs in China is the inequality between the supply and demand 
for IPOs. They defined the odds of winning the lottery for IPO allocation (LOTTODD) as 
proxy for market demand and found that it has significantly negative impact on under-
pricing. They also found that firms in high-tech industry (IND) suffered higher under-
pricing. Besides, SEO, UNDWRI and EXCH are the other control variables to capture the 
influences of seasoned equity offering, the underwriter’s ranking and the stock exchange 
on under-pricing.  
Moreover, the information contained in book-building process is both unique and 
critical in understanding under-pricing, because book-building collects the institutional 
investors’ interest and valuation of IPO. For hypothesis 4, the obvious variables are the 
number of institutional investors participating in book-building where offer price range is 
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the bottom price in the range as proxy for magnitude of price range (PRIRAN).  
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) predicted that if it’s not possible to completely 
compensate truth-telling through increased share allocation, then under-pricing must also 
be used to compensate investors for revealing good information. Based on this, Hanley 
(1993) tested the final offer price adjustment from anticipated offer price disclosed in 
preliminary prospectus against under-pricing and documented a significantly positive 
relation between offer price adjustment and initial return based on a sample of 1,430 
IPOs on U.S.  
In China, the final offer price is limited within the price range settled in preliminary 
book-building. However, I divided IPOs on both stock exchanges into two groups: IPOs 
with positive price adjustment and IPOs with negative price adjustment and then I 
calculated the average under-pricing for each group. I found that opposite to the positive 
relation between price adjustment and under-pricing from Hanley’s paper, IPOs in China 
have larger under-pricing when offer price is adjusted downward, as shown in Figure [2]. 
IPOs calculated the under-pricing for IPOs with positive price adjustment and 
negativedue to the overall large magnitude of price range, the final price greatly deviates 
from the mid-level price range (arithmetic average of the highest and lowest price in the 
range), which could have changed the level of under-pricing. So I include the percentage 
adjustment of offer price from expected price in book-building (PRIADJ) in the model. In 
Hanley’s paper, she also discussed about the offer size adjustment and therefore, I also 
add the percentage adjustment of offer size from the size previously disclosed in 
preliminary book-building (SIZEADJ) to the model.  
All the above independent variables as well as the dependent variable are defined in 
Appendix 1 and the expected signs of independent variable have also been summarized.  
4.4  Data Sources and Statistic Descriptions 
The data set in this paper comes from various sources and is mostly hand-collected. 
The four major sources I approached in preparing the data are : 1) Tsinghua University 
China Center for Financial Research; 2) Shanghai Stock Exchange or Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange websites; 3) Prospectus or book-building result announcement downloaded 
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website by China Securities Regulatory Commission; 4) RESSET (Rui Si Financial 
Database). All sources are publicly accessible by investors. Appendix 2 is a summary of 
the data and their resources.  
The statistics description of both dependent and independent variables are 
summarized in Table [4]. In order to avoid distortion from outliers, except the dummy 
and integral variables, all variable have been winsorized in 1~99 percentile interval and 
observations beyond 1 and 99 percentile are set to be equal to the border values.  
First, market-adjusted initial return (MAR) has large standard deviation. The lowest 
value is negative, while the highest value is nearly 500%. After IPO, the average 
percentage of equity ownership by Government and State-owned enterprise in IPOs on 
SHSE is much higher than IPOs on SZSE, because most IPOs on Shanghai are blue-chips 
in key industry, while IPOs on Shenzhen especially since 2005 are SMEs with majority 
stockownership from private sector. Besides, the stockownership of IPOs on SZSE after 
offering is more diversified, because the average controlling stockownership 
(CONTROWN) of SZSE is lower than SHSE.  
Generally, IPOs under-perform over the long term, as the average cumulative 1 year 
market-adjusted stock return after offering (LGTMPERF) is very negative. In the long 
run, IPOs on SZSE under-perform more than IPOs on SHSE, only -60.10% on average. 
However, IPOs’ long-term performances vary greatly from each other. The worst 
performance is -248.18%, while the highest performing IPO has almost doubled the first-
trading day closing price. The profitability variables of IPOs on SZSE are on average 
better than IPOs on SHSE, as average EPS, ROE and NICAGR on SZSE are higher. The 
average IPO size on SHSE is larger than that on SZSE, that is because firms on SZSE are 
of smaller scales, they are not expected to finance large volume of capital from primary 
market. The financial leverage (DE) of firms on the two stock exchanges are quite close, 
with average debt/equity ratio around 55%. And there’s not much difference in firm age 
on the two exchanges. The average P/E on SZSE is higher than that on SHSE, which is 
reasonable, because IPOs on SZSE are SMEs with high growth potential, yet high risks. 
Issuers on SHSE seem not care much about the timing for IPO listing, because the 
average market-index return 30-days before IPO (PREMKTRET) is negative. However, 
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because for small-size IPOs, a good market condition is very critical to guarantee the 
success of IPO offering. The time interval from IPO offering to listing is larger in SHSE, 
which might be due to the procedures of IPO listing on SHSE are more complex and thus 
require longer time. The odds of winning IPO allocation bidding lottery (LOTTODD) on 
SZSE is on average much lower than that on SHSE for IPO. Since the IPO size on SZSE 
is not as big as IPO size on SHSE, it must be because of more market demand for IPOs 
on SZSE. According to Chi and Padgett (2005), the imbalance of IPO stocks’ supply and 
demand is more serious in SZSE.  
During preliminary book-building, there are more institutional investors participating 
in price consultation in SHSE than SZSE. It’s also reasonable because the IPO size and 
firm scale on SHSE are larger than SZSE and therefore the underwriter for IPOs on 
SHSE will invite more investors for book-building and stock allocation. The average 
price range on SZSE is larger than that on SHSE, that is because underwriters for IPOs 
on SZSE are of lower ranks and their pricing ability is relatively less strong or because 
IPOs on SZSE are of higher uncertainty (average higher P/E ratio and lower IPO size), 
the larger price range thus reflects the uncertainty implied in valuation. The average price 
adjustment for IPOs on both stock exchanges is negative, probably because underwriters 
in China tend to lower the final offer price before listing to obtain oversubscription, cause 
a buzz and therefore guarantee stock premium on first trading day. IPOs on SZSE are 
discounted more from average price range in book-building than IPOs on SHSE, which 
could be because IPOs on SZSE are of more uncertainty and require much lower offer 
price to secure a successful listing. None of the IPO finally adjusts the offer size upward 
after book-building, which also indicates that underwriters are more comfortable with 
less aggressive equity financing, as lower volume more easily gain oversubscription.  
Table [5] shows the correlation among variables from 2001 to 2007, combining IPOs 
on both stock exchanges. The high correlations recorded are EPS and ROE, IPOSIZE and 
LOTTODD. The first pair’s relation is easy to understand, both reflect the profitability to 
stockholders. The positive relation between IPO proceed and odds of winning online 
bidding lottery is also not difficult to explain, because large IPO size offer large volume 
of supply and LOTTODD is supposed to be higher, reflecting that the imbalance of IPO 
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higher correlation because higher level controlling stockownership is normally by 
government or state-owned enterprises, while private sectors often hold lower controlling 
stake once the company gets listed. There’s 0.31 correlations co-efficient between 
PREMKTPERF and MAR, which indicates that the under-pricing of IPO follows the 
market conditions, higher under-pricing associated with bull market and vice versa. IPOs 
on SHSE tend to have more SEOs, as the correlations co-efficient between SEO and 
EXCH is 0.22. There’s also 0.22 correlation between LOTTODD and STATOWN, 
because stated-controlled IPO size is larger and imbalance of supply and demand is less 
serious. PE has 0.29 correlations with MAR, which is consistent with hypothesis 3 that 
high-uncertain IPOs have higher under-pricing. The relation between UNDWRI and 
IPOSIZE is -0.48, which makes sense because larger volume IPO normally invites 
underwriter of higher rank, in this case smaller integral value (0 is the highest rank and 2 
is the lowest rank).  Therefore the correlation between UNDWRI and LOTTODD is -0.37, 
higher-ranking underwriter is associated with higher odds of lottery success. High-tech 
industry normally have more diversified stock-ownership, therefore the correlation 
between IND and STATOWN as well CONTROWN is both negative. The correlation 
between IND and PE is slightly positive 0.08, which is consistent the assumption that 
high-tech industry has higher P/E ratio. PE has relatively high correlation with BKBD 
0.29, showing that P/E ratios of IPOs post book-building become higher, either because 
since 2005, the stock market in China was booming and investors are confident of IPO 
firms’ fundamental performance or because the offer price compared to fixed-pricing 
period has been adjusted upwards to reflect more accurate market valuation. Market 
conditions post book-building also turn better, with 0.43 correlations with BKBD, which 
could be the reason that MAR become higher after book-building and the increase of 
under-pricing is driven by market conditions neglecting the effect of book-building. 
Based on -0.71 between EXCH and BKBD. Correlation between LOTTODD and BKBD 
is 0.19, which shows that with the introduction of book-building, the imbalance of supply 
and demand of IPO is eased.  
 195  Empirical Analysis on the Effect of China’s Book-building  
5.1  Hypothesis 1—The effectiveness of book-building on under-pricing 
Model 1 is used test Hypothesis 1— whether the introduction of book-building to 
China’s IPO market has significantly reduced under-pricing. 
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In the model, BKBD is a period dummy variable. It equals to 1 when the IPO is listed 
after January 1, 2005. The independent variables used in the model are mainly chosen 
based on past empirical studies on China’s IPOs and are proved significant in explaining 
under-pricing. The detailed discussion on independent variables is in Section 4.3 and 
their definitions are listed in Appendix 1. STATOWN, CONTROWN, LGTMPERF, EPS, 
ROE and NICAGR are proxies for firm quality; IPOSIZE, DE, AGE and PE are proxies 
for ex-ante uncertainty. Besides, I included control variables PREMKTRET, TIMELAG, 
LOTTODD, SEO, UNDWRI, IND and EXCH to capture the effect of market conditions 
before IPO, time interval between IPO offering and listing date, odds of winning online 
bidding lottery, seasoned-equity offering, underwriter’s ranking, industry as well as the 
stock exchange where IPO gets listed. The result has been adjusted by White 
Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance, and is displayed in Table 
[6].  
The co-efficient of BKBD dummy for all three groups is positive and they are 
significant on 5% level for the full sample and SHSE sub-sample. On average, the under-
pricing increased 41.815% after book-building for IPOs on Shanghai Stock Exchange and 
increased 33.2% for IPOs on both stock exchanges as a whole, which is quite significant 
increase. The finding is obviously against Hypothesis 1 that with the introduction of 
book-building, IPO under-pricing on China’s A-stock market should have decreased.  
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Jenkinson and Wilhelm (2003) found the sign of book-building dummy co-efficient 
negative though not significant. The same result from papers with China IPO data [Wang, 
He and Zhang (2006), Yang and Zhao (2006)]. In Yang and Zhao (2006), the coefficient 
of book-building dummy is even significantly positive. 
The possible explanations for the unexpected result could be: 1) IPOs listed on 
Shanghai Stock Exchange since 2005 are mostly large blue-chip stocks in key industries. 
Because of their better quality (higher equity retained by government and controlling 
stockholders), they are well-received by public investors and there is overwhelming 
demand on the first-day of trading on secondary market; 2) In mid-2005, IPO listing was 
suspended in order to pave the way for stock-reform. Once the suspension was removed 
in mid-2006, the long-waited capitals for IPO on secondary market increase the under-
pricing on Shanghai Stock Exchange. We can find evidence from Figure [1] that on 
SHSE, in 2005 when book-building was first introduced, the under-pricing was much 
lower. However, it dramatically increased from 2006; 3) In Table [5], the correlation 
between PREMKTRET and BKBD is 0.43, which indicates that after book-building, the 
market conditions shortly before IPO offering become higher. Therefore, such bull-
market effect could have caused high under-pricing.  
To prove the authenticity of my data and justify the above finding, I then reconducted 
the test on IPO sample until 2005 only, excluding data in 2006 and 2007.  The co-
efficient of book-building dummy now became significantly negative (not shown here), 
which is consistent with Hypothesis 1 and the past literatures with China’s data.  
Besides, I find some interesting results in Table [6] about the influence of other 
independent variables, which overall support the signaling and ex-ante uncertainty theory 
in Hypothesis 2 & 3 throughout the whole data period.  
Firm quality proxies: STATOWN, LGTMPERF and NICAGR find some evidence of 
impact on under-pricing. More equity retained by government, higher aftermarket IPO 
return and net income growth rate are associated with higher market-adjusted initial 
return. For IPOs on Shenzhen Stock Exchange, equity ownership by government is not 
significant, probably because the majority of IPOs on SZSE are SMEs and are 
dominantly owned by private sectors, such effect on under-pricing is not obvious. 
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and PE. Firms with smaller IPO proceeds and higher P/E ratio are considered to more 
speculative and associated with higher under-pricing. The significance of IPO proceeds 
on SZSE not significant however, probably because referring to Table [4] and Table [5], 
the proceeds of IPOs on SZSE are on average smaller and less volatile, and therefore has 
smaller explanation power.  
Besides, some controlling variables like PREMKTRET, TIMELAG, LOTTODD as 
well as UNDWRI also show some significance for under-pricing. Strong market 
conditions pre-IPO offering, short time interval between IPO offer and list, lower lottery 
winning odds and more reputable underwriter lead to higher under-pricing. Industry and 
stock exchange factors are not significant.  
5.2  Hypothesis 2—The signaling effect of high-quality firms  
To test Hypothesis 2 and 3, I compare the significance of theory proxies before and 
after book-building. Table [7] displays the results on three groups: full sample, SHSE 
sub-sample and SZSE sub-sample. Results for pre-book-building include sample IPOs 
from 2001-2004 and results for post-book-building include IPOs from 2005-2007.  
Hypothesis 2 assumes that the significance of signaling theory proxies significantly 
decrease post-book-building. Taking a look at the top-1/3 of Table [7], the significance of 
STATOWN for all three groups has decreased after book-building, though the change is 
not significant, which provides limited support for Hypothesis 2. Similar result has been 
reached by NICAGR, the net income growth rate of IPOs, except that its significance 
unexpectedly increased for SZSE sub-sample post-book-building. But such change 
however is also non-significant.  
Perhaps the most controversial result comes from LGTMPERF, the long-term IPO 
stock performance after offering. For full sample and SZSE sub-sample, it becomes more 
significantly positive, while for SHSE sub-sample, its sign changes in just the opposite 
direction, becomes more significantly negative. This indicates that for IPOs on Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange, high IPO’s long-term performance is significantly associated with high 
under-pricing, i.e. the signaling effect from high-quality firm becomes even stronger 
post-book-building, For IPOs on Shanghai Stock Exchange, the relationship could be the 
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phenomenon that has received recognitions by numerous papers that IPOs with high 
initial return tend to under-perform in the long run [Beatty and Ritter (1986)]. From 
Table [6] we can find that the correlation between long-term stock performance and 
book-building dummy is -0.40, which further justify the above finding. Furthermore, in 
Table [6], correlation between market-adjusted initial return and book-building dummy is 
0.22, and from Section 5.1 we learned that the under-pricing on SHSE significantly 
increases after book-building, which provides reasonable explanation for stock price of 
IPOs on SHSE to under-perform in the long run in post-book-building period. 
Overall, I received limited support for Hypothesis 2 from the empirical study. The 
proxy of state-ownership and net income growth rate provides insignificant decrease in 
the significance of co-efficients. For IPOs on SZSE, the signaling effect becomes 
stronger post-book-building, based on the observation that the significance of 
LGTMPERF and NICAGR increases, which is against Hypothesis 2. The result also 
shows that on SHSE, IPOs after book-building that receive high first-day premium tend 
to under-perform in the long run. 
5.3  Hypothesis 3—Ex-ante uncertainty effect of issuing firms 
Hypothesis 3 assumes that ex-ante uncertainty effect will significantly decease after 
book-building. The result for Hypothesis 3 is displayed in the middle part of Table [7]. 
IPO proceeds (IPOSIZE) present itself as good proxy for ex-ante uncertainty, because its 
significance decreases for all three groups, especially significant for full sample and 
SHSE sub-sample. This provides strong support for Hypothesis 3 that firms with smaller 
IPO proceeds are perceived more risky and have significantly lead to high under-pricing, 
but such explanation power significantly decreases after book-building is introduced.  
Meanwhile, P/E ratio provides limited support to Hypothesis 3. For full sample and 
SHSE sub-sample, PE is significantly positive to under-pricing, indicating that firms with 
high-P/E is regarded as more speculative and require higher under-pricing. The 
significance decreases post-book-building, though still strongly significant. Such change 
in significance, however, is not significant.  
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efficient is negative, but it changes to significantly positive post-book-building, and the 
change is significant. This means that ex-ante uncertainty effect for IPOs on SZSE 
represented by P/E ratio significantly increases, which is against Hypothesis 3. This could 
be because after book-building, SME Board is launched on SZSE and firms filing for IPO 
on SZSE are of high-P/E afterwards, the discount required by investors therefore is 
higher as compensation for running higher uncertain risks and intensified winners’ curse 
problem.  
In conclusion, Hypothesis 3 receives mixed approval. IPO proceeds provide strong 
support for Hypothesis 3 that the ex-ante uncertainty effect on under-pricing significantly 
dropped post-book-building, especially for IPOs on SHSE. P/E ratio provides limited 
support as the decrease in significance is not obvious. Ex-ante uncertainty effect for IPOs 
on SZSE presented by P/E actually increases significantly, which is against Hypothesis 3.  
There’s also significant change in control variables for the three groups before and 
after book-building. 1) TIMELAG, the time interval between offer day and listing day, 
become significantly more negative after book-building. This is probably because longer 
time interval from listing provides investors with more sufficient time to conduct analysis 
on the coming IPO and the secondary market initial return therefore decreases due to 
more rational investment strategy. 2) The impact of LOTTODD, proxy for imbalance of 
market demand and supply for IPO, significantly changed from positive to negative. 
From Table [5], I find that the correlation between odds of lottery and book-building 
dummy is 0.19, meaning that the odds increase after book-building, and the imbalance of 
supply and demand is eased after book-building. The increase of 1% in lottery odds 
significantly decreases under-pricing by 54.723% initial return in full sample. 3) The co-
efficient of SEO integral variable becomes significantly negative after book-building for 
all three groups. Observing from Table [5], I find that correlation between SEO and 
BKBD dummy is 0.26, indicating that IPOs are more likely to issue seasoned-equity 
offering after book-building, probably because of the bull market conditions, and from 
the correlation of SEO and EXCH, I know that IPOs on SHSE are more likely to issue 
SEO than IPOs on SZSE. With more knowledge on issuing firms post-book-building and 
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chase the initial offering and save for later investment.  
 
5.4  Hypothesis 4—The effect of book-building information variables 
To test Hypothesis 4, I added two more representative proxies to Model 1: the 
number of qualified institutional investors invited to conduct price consultation in book-
building process (BKBDER) and the percentage range of IPO price bid by investors 
participating in price consultation (PRIRAN). I also added the percentage adjustment of 
offer price from the expected price implied in price range (PRIADJ) and the percentage 
adjustment of IPO size from the offer size disclosed in book-building (SIZEADJ). All the 
above variables are considered to have valuable information regarding book-building in 
China.  
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The regression result of Model 2 is displayed in Table [8]. In all three groups, 
BKBDER has significant effect on under-pricing, but with opposite sign against 
Hypothesis 4 that more institutional investors involved in book-building should have 
increased the pricing accuracy and lowered under-pricing. The possible explanation could 
be that more institutional investors actually caused “information cascade” on the 
secondary market, which is a common phenomenon in China’s security markets. Public 
investors in China tend to observe the action taken by institutional investors, more 
institutions interested in book-building indicates the IPO is a “hot issue”. They then buy 
from the secondary market once the IPO get listed and drive up initial return. So the 
“herding behavior” dominate the information collection advantage of book-building,.  
PRIRAN, however is not significant for all three groups, but the positive co-efficient 
in full sample and SZSE sub-sample shows limited support for Hypothesis 4 that large 
price range bid by institutional investors in preliminary book-building reflects 
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the issuing firm as well, so under-pricing should be higher. 
PRIADJ has negative co-efficient for all three groups, and is significant for full 
sample and SZSE sub-sample, which is against the assumption that price adjustment is 
positively associated with under-pricing, based on Hanley (1993). From Figure [2], I 
observe the same trend on both stock exchanges that, on average, the under-pricing of 
negative price adjustment is higher than that of positive adjustment. The negative effect 
could be attributed to the over-reaction of underwriters in determining IPO price after 
book-building. Favorable bidding interests from investors in book-building may be 
regarded by underwriters as heated demand and they adjust the offer price higher than the 
expected level of preliminary price range. The buy-force on secondary market once the 
IPO gets listed, however, is not as high as expected, thus the under-pricing decreases. On 
the other hand, if negative demand information is received from book-building, the 
underwriters may worry that IPOs will not get enough demand from secondary market, 
and therefore adjust the price lower than expected. Public investors may consider the 
offer price cheap and under-pricing on first-trading day rises up. 
SIZEADJ is only significantly positive for IPOs on SZSE, probably because on 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange, investors perceive negative adjustment in offer size 
(SIZEADJ only has non-positive values) as a signal of less confident in IPO from the 
issuer and underwriter. The interest of investment becomes lower and initial return of the 
IPO is low.  
 
Therefore, Table [8] provides limited support for Hypothesis 4 from the price range 
in book-building. Large number of institutional investors may become a signal of “hot 
issue” to public investors and cause “herding behavior” that drives up the initial return on 
first-day of trading. Besides, underwriters tend to over-adjust on offer price after 
information collection from book-building. Offer size adjustment is a more sentiment 
factor to investors on SZSE, who may consider this as negative signal for bad-quality 
IPO and bid lower on first-trading day.  
 
 266  Conclusion 
Book-building is regarded as an effective pricing method that causes lower under-
pricing according to literatures and is adopted by the majority of world’s primary markets. 
China therefore introduced book-building in IPO pricing process in January 1, 2005 in 
order to 1) increase the accuracy of pricing 2) increase the pricing capabilities of 
institutional investors. Whether or not the original objectives have been achieved, due to 
the limitation of data (IPO list was suspended from mid-2005 to mid-2006 to pave the 
way for stock-reform), there are not many empirical studies conducted so far to test the 
effectiveness of book-building in China. However, based on data until the end of 2005, 
domestic papers all agreed that book-building has reduced under-pricing and increased 
the pricing accuracy. This paper included more data since 2005 to find out if book-
building has significantly decreased the extremely-high initial return of China’s IPOs and 
apart from that, to further discover what change has book-building brought to factors that 
caused under-pricing before. 
In this paper, there are 483 IPO samples collected from Tsinghua Financial Research 
Center from 2001 to 2007. The empirical test include three steps: 1) to test the 
significance of book-building period dummy on under-pricing 2) to compare the 
significance of variables on under-pricing before and after book-building 3) to find the 
effectiveness of information variables in book-building process on under-pricing.  
The result shows that though under-pricing post book-building significantly 
decreased in 2005, it significantly increased in 2006 and 2007, probably because 1) since 
book-building, SHSE has more blue-chip IPOs that attract overwhelming bid from public 
investors; 2) demand for IPO certainly increased upon the removal of IPO suspension in 
2006; 3) the year 2006 and 2007 have bull market conditions.  
Then I tested the theories proved to have significantly explained under-pricing by 
literatures with China’s IPO data: the signaling theory and ex-ante uncertainty theory. 
After comparing, there’s limited support for the hypothesis that the signaling effect on 
under-pricing has been reduced after book-building from data of full sample and 
Shanghai Stock Exchange sub-sample. Another finding is that on Shanghai Stock 
Exchange, IPOs after book-building with high under-pricing will under-perform more in 
the long run. For the hypothesis that ex-ante uncertain effect on under-pricing has 
 27significantly decreased after book-building, I received strong support from IPO proceeds 
proxy, limited support from P/E ratio. However, P/E ratio for Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
sub-sample indicates that the ex-ante effect significantly increases after book-building. 
This is probably because SME Board on Shenzhen Stock Exchange has been launched 
since book-building took effect and SME IPOs are of higher P/E and higher uncertainty. 
 Furthermore, I compiled four variables as proxy for the information value of book-
building in China: the number of institutional investors involved in pricing consultation, 
the price range determined in preliminary book-building, the adjustment on offer price 
and offer size from the expected price and size disclosed in book-building. The result is 
against our hypothesis that more institutional investors increase pricing accuracy and 
reduce under-pricing. More institutional investors invited in book-building could be 
considered as signal of “hot issue” and leads to “herding behavior” on secondary market. 
Price range shows limited support for the hypothesis that larger range is evidence of 
higher under-pricing, because the positive co-efficient is not significant. Finally, another 
interesting finding is that underwriters tend to over-adjust IPO price after demand 
information is collected in book-building. Such over-adjustment caused under-pricing to 
increase when negative information is received in book-building and under-pricing to 
decrease when positive information is received.  
In summary, I have received the following implications from the empirical studies in 
this paper: 
1)  Book-building pricing method introduced into China’s primary market has not 
reduced under-pricing as expected; on the other hand, the under-pricing has 
significantly increased possibly due to other external effects. 
2)  Book-building has to some extent reduced the signaling and ex-ante uncertainty 
effect on under-pricing. That is probably because through the delivery of due 
diligence report to investors and two rounds of book-building, more information has 
been disclosed from the issuer-side that reduced the unnecessary price discount. 
3)  IPOs on Shanghai Stock Exchange after book-building that have higher initial 
return will significantly under-perform more than IPOs with lower initial returns. 
This is probably due to the overwhelming demand for blue-chip stocks and the 
removal of IPO listing suspension that drive up under-pricing dramatically in 2006 
 28and 2007. In the long-run, those high-under-pricing stocks will return to its normal 
level.  
4)  Ex-ante uncertainty effect proxied by P/E ratio for IPOs on Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange significantly increase, probably because with the launch of SME Board, 
the majority of IPOs on SZSE are of small and medium-sized and from high-tech 
industry with higher P/E ratio. Investors consider them of high uncertainty that will 
intensify winner’s curse problem, therefore require higher price discount.  
5)  Large number of institutional investors involved in book-building will easily be 
distorted as signal of “hot issue” and cause “herding behavior” that sarcastically 
increase under-pricing, as public investors on secondary market in China closely 
observe the actions from institutions. Besides, under-writers tend to over-adjust 
offer price based on the information collected from book-building. 
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Appendix 1 Definition of Variables  
 
Variables Definition  Sign 
Dependent Variable:     
MAR  The percentage increase of IPO’s first-trading day closing price from its offer price, 
adjusted by market index return in this same period. 
 
Independent 
Variables: 
   
STATOWN  Percentage of government or state-owned enterprise (SOE) ownership of IPO post 
offering 
+ 
CONTROWN  Percentage of controlling stockholder ownership post offering  + 
LGTMPERF  Market-adjusted cumulative return of IPO stock one year post offering   + 
EPS  Historical weighted-average* earnings per share in last three years before IPO offering  + 
ROE  Historical weighted-average return on equity in last three years before IPO offering  + 
NICAGR  Compound Annual Growth Rate of Net income ** in last three years before offering  + 
IPOSIZE  Logarithm of IPO proceeds   - 
DE Historical  weighted-average  D/E  + 
AGE  Time between the date of IPO firm filing registration with China’s Commerce Bureau 
and listing  
- 
PE  Offer Price/earnings per share before offering  + 
PREMKTRET  Market index’s cumulated return 30 days before offering   
TIMELAG  Lag of time between the date of IPO offering and listing   
LOTTODD  Odd of winning the lottery of online IPO allocation, equal to reciprocal of 
oversubscription ratio 
 
SEO  Dummy variable for seasoned equity offering post IPO offering    
UNDWRI  Underwriters’ ranking in 2007    
IND  High-tech industry dummy: if IPO belongs to high-tech industry, IND=1; otherwise 
IND=0. 
 
EXCH  Exchange dummy: EXCH=1 if IPO is listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange, EXCH=0 if 
IPO is listed on Shenzhen Stock Exchange.  
 
BKBD  Book-building period dummy: if IPO listed before 2005, BKBD=0; otherwise, BKBD=1;   
BKBDER  Number of institutional investors participating in preliminary book-building where offer 
price range is settled. 
 
PRIRAN  Percentage of offer price range settled in preliminary book-building process.   
PRIADJ  Percentage adjustment of final offer price from the expected offer price (arithmetic 
average of high-end and low-end prices in price range) implied in preliminary book-
building.  
 
SIZEADJ  Percentage adjustment of offer size from initial offer size disclosed before book-building.   
** CAGR= [ 
 
 
* The weight is determined by proportion of one-year. For example, the weight for half-year earnings data is 0.5.  
1
# of years Ending Value
Beginning Value
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Appendix 2 Data Sources 
Data Components  Sources 
  
Tsinghua Financial 
Research Center 
SHSE/SZSE 
Exchange 
Websites 
Prospectus/Book-
building Result 
Announcement from 
www.cninfo.com.cn
RESSET 
MAR IPO  offer  price  √        
  IPO’s closing price on first-trading day    √      
  Market-index closing price on IPO offer day        √   
  Market-index closing price on IPO’s first-trading day        √   
STATOWN  Government or state-owned enterprises’ equity ownership 
post-IPO 
   √     
CONTROWN  Controlling stockownership post-IPO      √     
LGTMPERF  IPO’s stock closing price one year after offer    √      
  Market-index closing price one year after offer        √   
EPS  Historical earnings per share for last three years before IPO      √     
ROE  Historical return on earnings for last three years before IPO      √     
NICAGR  Historical net earnings for last three years before IPO      √     
IPOSIZE IPO  proceeds  √        
DE  Historical debt and net equity for last three years before IPO      √     
AGE  The day of registration with the Commercial Bureau of 
China 
   √     
PE  Offer price over last-year earnings per share before IPO      √     
TIMELAG  IPO offer date and listing date  √        
PREMKTRET  Market-index closing price 30 days before IPO         √   
  Market-index closing price the day before IPO        √   
LOTTODD  Successful online lottery bidding rate       √     
SEO  Number of SEOs post-IPO    √      
UNDWRI*          
IND Industry  category  √        
 
* The source of underwriter ranking comes from Appendix 3 Appendix 3 Table of Underwriter Ranking  
The table is downloaded from 2007 IPO and SEO Underwriter Ranking, www.confol.com (Zhong Jin Zai Xian). Because either the 
number of IPO underwritten or the capital raised in 2007 alone is too narrow to reflect the reputation of underwriter. So I multiplied 
their values in the last column and the category variable UNDWRI is determined by the multipliers. The top 5 underwriters have 
multiple values above 1000, and the next 12 underwriters’ multiple value is above 100.  
 
UNDWRI  No.  Underwriters  No. of  IPOs  Total Capital Raised  
(RMB100 million) 
No. of IPO×Total 
Capital Raised 
0  1  中金公司  8 1256.23  10049.84 
0  2  中信证券  10 747.44  7474.4 
0  3  瑞银证券  5 539.04  2695.2 
0  4  银河证券  3 546.49  1639.47 
0  5  中银国际  5 310.72  1553.6 
1  6  国信证券  16 60.45  967.2 
1  7  海通证券  7 122.4  856.8 
1  8  光大证券  10 56.44  564.4 
1  9  中信建投  6 88.26  529.56 
1  10  平安证券  12 39.82  477.84 
1  11  高盛高华  2 150.27  300.54 
1  12  广发证券  8 32.58  260.64 
1  13  信达证券  1 193.5  193.5 
1  14  国泰君安  2 59.37  118.74 
1  15  华泰证券  5 23.7  118.5 
1  16  招商证券  4 25.65  102.6 
2  17  齐鲁证券  1 38.67  38.67 
2  18  国金证券  4 9.5  38 
2  19  联合证券  2 18.96  37.92 
2  20  山西证券  3 10.76  32.28 
2  21  第一创业  3 8.94  26.82 
2  22  兴业证券  2 12.53  25.06 
2  23  长城证券  1 23.1  23.1 
2  24  南京证券  1 23.1  23.1 
2  25  东吴证券  3 7.03  21.09 
2  26  建银证券  3 6.74  20.22 
2  27  国元证券  3 6.63  19.89 
2  28  东方证券  2 8.12  16.24 
2  29  西南证券  2 4.15  8.3 
2  30  民族证券  2 3.83  7.66 
2  31  信达资产  2 3.54  7.08 
2  32  方正证券  2 3.44  6.88 
2  33  东北证券  2 3.14  6.28 
2  34  东莞证券  1 5.04  5.04 
2  35  财富证券  1 3.45  3.45 
2  36  渤海证券  1 2.91  2.91 
2  37  宏源证券  1 2.74  2.74 
2  38  东海证券  1 2.58  2.58 
2  39  国海证券  1 2.49  2.49 
2  40  广州证券  1 2.34  2.34 
2  41  民生证券  1 1.64  1.64 
2  42  新时代证券  1 1.41  1.41 
2  43  首创证券  1 0.84  0.84 
2  44  长江证券     0 
2  45  申银万国     0 
2  46  浙商证券     0 
2  47  济南证券     0 
2  48  恒泰证券     0 
2  49  安信证券     0 
2  50  太平洋证券     0 
2  51  华龙证券     0 
2  52  华欧国际     0 
2  53  上海远东     0 
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Table [1] Number of IPOs in China by Year of Issuing, 2001-2007 
 
Table 1 is a summary of the number of IPOs used in the sample from 2001 to 2007. There are 483 sample 
IPOs on both Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE). The entire time 
period is further divided into two by the introduction of book-building pricing method: 1) the pre-book-
building period: 2001-2004 2) the post-book-building period 2005-2007.  
 
  Number of Sample IPOs 
  SHSE SZSE Total 
2001 63    63 
2002 69    69 
2003 66    66 
2004 59  39  98 
Total Pre-Book-building   257  39  296 
Percentage (%)  86.82  13.18  100 
      
2005 3  12  15 
2006 13  52  65 
2007 19  88  107 
Total Post-Book-building  35  152  187 
Percentage (%)  18.72  81.28  100 
      
Total 292  192  483 
Percentage (%)  60.33  39.67  100 
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Table [2] Summary of Empirical Studies on China’s IPO Under-pricing 
Table 2 summarizes the empirical studies on China’s under-pricing. There’re normally two ways to 
measure under-pricing by the authors: initial return and market-adjusted initial return. Some empirical 
studies also cover B-stock market, where only foreign capitals are allowed to trade.  
 
Under-pricing 
Author(s) Time  Period  Dataset  Initial Return  Market-adjusted 
Initial Return 
Mok and Hui (1998)  19 December, 1990 
to 31 December, 
1993 
87 A-stock (SHSE) 
22 B-stock (SHSE) 
 289% 
26% 
Su and Fleisher 
(1999) 
1 January, 1987 to 
31 December, 1995 
308 A-stock  948.59%   
Liu (2003)  1 January, 1999 to 
31 December, 2002 
354 A-stock  135.01%  132.49% 
Gu (2003)  1984-2000  478 A-stock (SHSE)  398%   
Chen et al. (2004)  1992-1997  734 A-stock 
117 B-stock 
 298% 
25% 
1993-1998 570  A-stock  178%    Chan et al.(2004) 
1995-1998 39  B-stock 11.6%   
Su (2004a)  1 January, 1994 to 
31 December, 1999 
348 A-stock  124.2%   
Su (2004b)  January, 1994 to 
December, 1999 
587 A-stock  128.2%   
Chi and Padgett 
(2005) 
1 January, 1996 to 
31 December, 2000 
668 A-stock    129.16% 
2004 97  A-stock  70.04%  70.28%  Wang, He and Zhang 
(2006)  2005 15  A-stock  45.12%  45.47% 
Yang and Zhao 
(2006) 
2005 15  A-stock    48.38% 
November, 2001 to 
December, 2004 
243 A-stock  90.68%    Tian and Wang 
(2007) 
2005 15  A-stock  45.12%   
Deng and Dorfleitner 
(2008) 
2002-2004 237  A-stock  88.67%  89.61% 
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Table [3] Average Initial Return and Market-adjusted Initial Return of China’s IPOs 
by Year of Issuing and by Stock Exchange, 2001-2007 
Table 3 displays the average under-pricing measured in both initial returns (IR):  10
0
P P
P
−  and market-adjusted 
initial returns (MAR):  11
00
P M
P M
−  on an annual basis. The time period is divided into pre-book-building (2001-
2004) and post-book-building (2005-2007) on each stock exchange. 
Shanghai Stock Exchange 
   IR(%)  MAR(%) 
 No.  Mean  Median  Max.  Min.  Mean  Median  Max.  Min. 
2001  63 140.60 123.33 413.79 0.74 140.58 122.49 416.22 0.18 
2002  69 125.65 110.99 428.25 11.33 125.91 109.77 435.37 10.10 
2003  66 71.84  64.00 227.99  10.73 71.89  64.35 226.81  10.78 
2004  59 71.62  68.44 269.78  -5.24 72.02  67.10 269.78  -6.59 
2001-2004   257  103.09 87.63 428.25  -5.24  103.87 88.29 430.15  -1.57 
2005  3 74.75 78.97 133.86  11.43  76.30 80.43 134.27  14.22 
2006  13  37.90 37.23 71.70 0.00 38.30 37.81 71.48 0.33 
2007  19  105.20 93.16 214.59  32.25  105.60 91.59 214.18  33.69 
2005-2007  35  77.59 70.81  214.59  0.00 71.24 67.25  206.37  -1.23 
Total  292  100.04 86.41 428.25  -5.24  100.40 86.54 430.15  -1.57 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
   IR(%)  MAR(%) 
 No.  Mean  Median  Max.  Min.  Mean  Median  Max  Min. 
2001-2004  39  68.28 52.22  324.89  -9.00  71.24 56.13  329.72  -5.54 
2005  12  37.72 44.81 74.12 2.79 38.15 44.00 74.21 2.83 
2006  52 97.85  86.74 345.71  -13.72  97.19  86.05 347.68  -12.60 
2007  88 212.14 194.85 538.12 -2.95 211.56 194.01 540.23 -5.65 
2005-2007  152  159.27  123.52  538.12 -13.72 156.14  123.16  488.88  -5.54 
Total  191  140.69 104.93 538.12  -13.72 138.8  106.98 488.88 -5.54 
               
Total  483  116.11 89.27 538.12  -13.72  115.52 90.18 488.88  -5.54 Table [4] Descriptive Statistics of Variables for IPOs in China’s A-stock Market, 2001-2007 
Table [4] compiles the descriptive statistics of variables used in the models of this paper, excluding those dummy and integral variables. The variables have been 
winsorized before compiling and are described respectively for IPOs on Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE).
  Full Sample  Subsample_SHSE  Subsample_SZSE 
 No.  Mean  Median  Max.  Min.  Std.  No. Mean  Median  Maxi.  Min. Std.  No. Mean Median Maxi.  Min.  Std. 
MAR  483  115.52  90.18 488.88 -5.54  92.54  292  100.40 86.54 430.15  -1.57  73.20  191 138.8 106.98  488.88  -5.54 112.17 
STATOWN  483  32.47  34.45 82.29 0.00  28.78  292  43.08 53.36 84.65  0.00  26.45  191  16.24  0.00 79.08  0.00 24.30 
CONTROWN  483  44.90  43.19 86.29 6.14  15.79  292  45.49 46.96 79.59  9.31  16.28  191  39.40 39.00 73.87  9.31 14.08 
LGTMPERF  483 -32.05  -22.04  104.97  -248.18 53.89 292 -13.71  -18.37 99.44  -69.46  24.15  191  -60.10 -32.59  104.97 -248.18  71.87 
EPS  467  0.36  0.36  14.25  0.02  0.77  286  0.37 0.31 2.62  0.08  0.31  181  0.51 0.45 1.39  0.15  0.22 
ROE  470  19.72  20.06 60.81 1.22  9.01  287  19.51 17.84 58.21  4.71  9.69  183  23.42 22.78 49.67  6.81  7.10 
NICAGR  482 30.04  22.31  269.52  -50.06 39.08 291 29.92  21.38  269.52 -50.06 43.27 191  30.24  25.35  162.73  -50.06  31.62 
IPOSIZE 483  19.84  19.59 24.92 16.99  1.09  292  20.16 19.80 24.78  18.42  1.22  191  19.42 19.33 22.14  18.42 0.55 
DE  482  55.56  57.72  104.37  10.11  13.79  292  56.84 57.98 98.19  14.08  14.45  190  55.64 57.01 93.96  14.08  13.29 
AGE  483 4.35  3.78  104.32  0.08  3.33 292 4.65  3.47  18.96  0.22  3.25 191  5.22  4.70  17.96  0.08  3.29 
PE  483  21.71  20.00 98.67 2.63  8.67  292  22.55 20.00 76.18  7.66  9.82  191  24.08 24.80 36.39  7.66  5.91 
PREMKTRET  483  1.66  -0.54 29.20  -15.61  9.77  292  -0.45 -1.17 29.20  -15.61  6.67  191 4.88  3.97 29.20 -15.61  12.52 
TIMELAG  483  18.61  15.00  87  7  6.72  292  17.98 15.00 56.00  7.00  7.71  191  14.72 15.00 24.00  7.00  3.35 
LOTTODD  482  0.20  0.10 5.33 0.02  0.45  292  0.31 0.09 3.28  0.03  0.55  190  0.19 0.12 1.16  0.02  0.20 
BKBDER  187 91.19  94  176  24  35.92 35 111.43  111  175  40  42.24 152  86.14  93  159  28  32.92 
PRIRAN  187  107.09  100.73  299.11  33.33 41.45 35  6.35  4.06  22.81  0.90  5.56 152  7.90  6.95  26.98  1.70  4.86 
PRIADJ 187  -7.27  -6.93 16.00  -35.12  11.53  35  -2.85 -1.69 16.00  -27.14  10.10  152  -8.04 -7.48 57.85 -38.74  12.71 
SIZEADJ  187  -3.73  0.00 0.00  -41.00  8.96  35  -7.66 0.00 0.00  -39.39  13.37  152  -2.83 0.00 0.00 -41.00  7.37 
 39  MAR STATOWN CONTROWN LGTMPERF EPS  ROE NICAGR IPOSIZE  DE AGE PE PREMKTRET  TIMELAG  LOTTODD  SEO  UNDWRI IND  EXCH  BKBD 
MAR 1.00  -0.08  -0.02  -0.03  -0.07  -0.07  0.05  -0.30  -0.06  0.02  0.29  0.31  -0.08  -0.20  -0.07  0.03  0.05  -0.21  0.22 
STATOWN   1.00  0.50  0.20  -0.18  -0.35  -0.06  0.31  -0.01  -0.20  -0.06 -0.14  0.10  0.22  0.00  -0.13  -0.22  0.44  -0.21 
CONTROWN     1.00  0.12  0.01  -0.07 0.01  0.20 -0.04  -0.30  -0.03  -0.03  0.11  0.14  0.07  -0.02 -0.17  0.18  -0.04 
LGTMPERF       1.00 -0.08  -0.03  0.09 0.24  -0.04  -0.14  -0.02  -0.19  0.13  0.10 0.16  -0.12  -0.08  0.43  -0.40 
EPS       1.00  0.62  0.03  -0.02  0.04  0.05  -0.13  0.06  -0.04  -0.07  -0.09  0.01  0.16  -0.24  0.20 
ROE           1.00  0.05  -0.06  0.07  -0.15  -0.14  0.07  -0.02  -0.14  -0.02  0.04  0.24  -0.21  0.07 
NICAGR             1.00  0.21  0.17  -0.04  0.01  0.07  -0.01  0.23  0.05  -0.13  0.03  -0.02  0.06 
IPOSIZE               1.00  0.23  0.08  0.20  0.00  -0.01  0.72  -0.06  -0.48  -0.13  0.32  0.10 
DE                 1.00  0.07  0.09  0.05  -0.02  0.17  0.08  -0.12  -0.18  0.01  0.09 
AGE                    1.00 0.06  0.16  -0.10  0.04  -0.11  -0.13  -0.07 -0.10  0.21 
PE                      1.00  0.15  0.17  0.25 -0.11  -0.15 0.08  -0.10  0.29 
PREMKTRET                       1.00  -0.13  0.07  -0.14  -0.07  -0.02  -0.29  0.43 
TIMELAG                        1.00  0.08  0.03  0.03  0.01  0.24  -0.33 
LOTTODD                        1.00  -0.12  -0.37  -0.08  0.11  0.19 
SEO                            1.00  0.07  -0.05  0.22  -0.26 
UNDWRI                             1.00  0.01  -0.07  -0.20 
IND                               1.00  -0.05  -0.03 
EXCH                                  1.00  -0.71 
BKBD                                    1.00 
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Table [5] Correlation among Independent Variables, 2001-2007 
 
Table [5] shows the correlations co-efficient of variables used in the models. MAR is the independent variable that represents market-adjusted initial return of 
IPO on its first day of listing. The rest are independent variables. All variables have been winsorized into 1-99 percentiles for more accuracy.  41
Table [6] Regression Result for the Effectiveness of Book-building 
Table 6 shows the results of test on Hypothesis 1: under-pricing on China’s A-stock IPO market should 
have decreased after the introduction of book-building. The regression is conducted on three groups: the 
full sample, sub-sample on SHSE and sub-sample on SZSE. The number of observations for each group 
has been adjusted for missing-value. T-statistic of each co-efficient is in parentheses. * represents 10% 
significance level, and ** represents 5% significant level. Adjusted-R Square is also provided.
Independent Variables  Full Sample  Subsample_SHSE  Subsample_SZSE 
C 
887.192** 
(6.846) 
1023.858** 
(6.906) 
101.648 
(0.313) 
STATOWN 
0.311* 
(1.791) 
0.364* 
(1.921) 
0.265 
(0.852) 
CONTROWN 
0.330 
(1.226) 
0.091 
(0.311) 
0.332 
(0.668) 
LGTMPERF 
0.251** 
(2.791) 
-0.179 
(-1.079) 
0.213* 
(1.954) 
EPS 
-16.430 
(-1.166) 
-14.440 
(-1.045) 
-20.119 
(-0.400) 
ROE 
-0.033 
(-0.063) 
-0.519 
(-1.172) 
0.394 
(0.196) 
NICAGR 
0.314** 
(3.315) 
0.227** 
(2.735) 
0.480* 
(1.925) 
IPOSIZE 
-43.014** 
(-6.293) 
-47.846** 
(-6.401) 
-5.987 
(-0.349) 
DE 
-0.116 
(-0.407) 
-0.236 
(-0.770) 
-0.030 
(-0.049) 
AGE 
-0.625 
(0.505) 
-0.743 
(-0.596) 
1.476 
(0.644) 
PE 
3.628** 
(6.815) 
2.673** 
(5.696) 
7.217** 
(4.911) 
PREMKTRET 
2.175** 
(4.217) 
1.856** 
(2.752) 
2.330** 
(3.201) 
TIMELAG 
-1.315** 
(-2.179) 
-0.378 
(-0.669) 
-2.532 
(-1.206) 
LOTTODD 
-18.284* 
(-1.690) 
6.670 
(0.613) 
-120.959** 
(-3.062) 
SEO 
-10.537 
(-1.085) 
0.253 
(0.024) 
-28.208 
(-1.135) 
UNDWRI 
-10.634* 
(-1.789) 
-11.536** 
(-2.084) 
-4.980 
(-0.332) 
IND 
-2.780 
(0.269) 
2.447 
(0.221) 
11.079 
(0.545) 
EXCH 
17.160 
(1.341) 
  
BKBD 
33.200** 
(2.432) 
41.815** 
(2.422) 
11.640 
(0.507) 
No. of observations  462  285  177 
Adjusted-R Square  0.34  0.34  0.35  42
Table [7] Comparison of the Significance of Explanatory Variables before and after Book-building 
Table 7 displayed comparison results of theory proxies for Hypothesis 2 &3 on the group of full sample, SHSE sub-sample and SZSE sub-sample. Pre-book-building data include IPOs from 2001-2004. Post-book-building include 
IPOs from 2005-2007.  The result of comparison is represented by P-value columns. Low level of P-value indicates significant change in the effect of coefficient after book-building is introduced. Because all IPOs on SHSE after 
book-building are from non-high-tech industry, I excluded IND to avoid multi-linearity. T-statistics are in parentheses under each co-efficient value. * represents 10% level of significance and ** represents 5% level of significance. 
Adjusted R-square is also provided for each regression. 
 
  Full Sample  Subsample_SHSE  Subsample_SZSE 
  Pre-book-building Post-book-building    Pre-book-building Post-book-building    Pre-book-building Post-book-building   
  Coefficient  Coefficient P-value  Coefficient  Coefficient  P-value  Coefficient  Coefficient P-value 
C  1332.074** 
(8.013) 
460.234* 
(1.947)  0.003  1428.311** 
(7.944) 
216.359 
(1.234)  0.000  845.656 
(0.916) 
144.385 
(0.417)  0.354 
STATOWN  0.323* 
(1.817) 
0.196 
(0.585)  0.737  0.390** 
(1.989) 
0.272 
(0.724)  0.738  -0.410 
(-0.941) 
0.289 
(0.792)  0.159 
CONTROWN  0.093 
(0.347) 
0.580 
(1.194)  0.376  0.034 
(0.116) 
0.609 
(0.845)  0.367  -0.242 
(-0.170) 
0.405 
(0.708)  0.584 
LGTMPERF  -0.091 
(-0.542) 
0.278** 
(2.682)  0.062  0.116 
(0.586) 
-0.500** 
(-3.690)  0.009  -0.365 
(-0.736) 
0.205* 
(1.782)  0.130 
EPS  -1.143 
(-0.080) 
-41.605 
(-1.041)  0.336  -5.204 
(-0.342) 
-18.542 
(-0.726)  0.595  113.256 
(0.821) 
-20.786 
(-0.393)  0.238 
ROE  -0.954** 
(-2.262) 
1.637 
(0.822)  0.199  -0.697 
(-1.536) 
1.298 
(0.946)  0.086  -2.329 
(-0.704) 
0.906 
(0.371)  0.355 
NICAGR  0.282** 
(3.057) 
0.312* 
(1.705)  0.881  0.311** 
(3.223) 
0.245* 
(1.970)  0.631  0.297 
(0.423) 
0.489* 
(1.884)  0.736 
IPOSIZE  -65.487** 
(-7.606) 
-16.651 
(-1.350)  0.001  -68.770** 
(-7.637) 
-6.140 
(-0.706)  0.000  -43.532 
(-0.912) 
-7.741 
(-0.424)  0.362 
DE  0.035 
(0.105) 
-0.515 
(-1.203)  0.312  -0.113 
(-0.298) 
-0.744* 
(-1.881)  0.207  -0.379 
(-0.418) 
-0.251 
(-0.373)  0.894 
AGE  -1.465 
(-0.984) 
1.862 
(0.912)  0.187  -0.948 
(-0.630) 
1.046 
(0.341)  0.481  -9.749 
(-0.801) 
1.775 
(0.731)  0.206 
PE  2.665** 
(4.955) 
3.695** 
(4.427)  0.298  2.878** 
(5.248) 
2.013** 
(3.401)  0.222  -2.365 
(-0.613) 
7.776** 
(4.823)  0.002 
PREMKTRET  2.893** 
(4.180) 
1.692** 
(2.671)  0.201  2.880** 
(4.033) 
-0.846 
(-1.034)  0..000  -2.986 
(-0.590) 
2.239** 
(3.008)  0.161 
TIMELAG  -0.081 
(-0.142) 
-5.783** 
(-3.031)  0.004  -0.326 
(-0.567) 
-4.061 
(-1.651)  0.062  9.816 
(1.442) 
-3.333 
(-1.481)  0.016 
LOTTODD  27.762* 
(1.896) 
-54.723** 
(-3.108)  0.000  25.788* 
(1.845) 
-31.245** 
(-3.100)  0.001  67.103 
(0.715) 
-154.871** 
(-4.105)  0.005 
SEO  -0.075 
(-0.008) 
-114.258** 
(-6.780)  0.000  -2.031 
(-0.203) 
-54.773** 
(-2.781)  0.004  19.088 
(0.418) 
-85.278** 
(-4.042)  0.009 
UNDWRI  -11.033** 
(-2.069) 
-4.977 
(-0.339)  0.696  -10.551* 
(-1.906) 
0.305 
(0.024)  0.340  -15.868 
(-0.563) 
-1.228 
(-0.072)  0.588 
IND  1.422 
(0.147) 
12.709 
(0.610)  0.621  0.339 
(0.033)    
-7.308 
(-0.217) 
9.317 
(0.415) 
26.183** 
(2.062) 
-29.286 
(-0.985)  0.084   
  
    
0.622 
EXCH 
No. of obs.  280  182 462  251  34 285  29  148 177 
Adj-R2  0.41  0.33 0.40  0.42  0.40  0.42  -0.24  0.34 0.35 Table [8] Regression Result on Information Variables in Book-building Process 
Table 8 has four more variables that reflect information value of book-building in China. The data period is post-book-
building from 2005-2007 for better observation. Again, the high-tech industry dummy for SHSE sub-sample is 
excluded from the model. T-statistics are in parentheses and Adjusted R-square is provided for each regression. 
Independent 
Variables  Full Sample  Subsample_SHSE  Subsample_SZSE 
C  777.668**  
(3.166) 
769.217** 
(3.164) 
484.368 
(1.271) 
STATOWN  0.128 
( 0.429) 
0.072 
(0.127) 
0.192 
(0.579) 
CONTROWN  0.738* 
(1.812) 
1.642** 
(2.163) 
0.537 
(1.106) 
LGTMPERF  -0.024 
(-0.236) 
-0.330* 
(-1.980) 
-0.059 
(-0.485) 
EPS  -42.726 
(-1.325) 
-30.330 
(-0.737) 
-40.039 
(-0.903) 
ROE  1.347 
(0.742) 
1.063 
(0.646) 
1.608 
(0.736) 
NICAGR  0.054 
(0.355) 
0.234* 
(1.951) 
0.033 
(0.145) 
IPOSIZE  -38.815** 
(-2.950) 
-39.343** 
(-2.494) 
-27.339 
(-1.364) 
DE  -0.136 
(-0.335) 
-0.434 
(-1.648) 
0.244 
(0.389) 
AGE  1.171 
(0.620) 
4.136 
(1.256) 
1.625 
(0.683) 
PE  1.510** 
(2.293) 
1.310** 
(3.161) 
2.953* 
(1.710) 
PREIPORET  0.972 
(1.626) 
-1.036 
(-1.399) 
1.510** 
(2.100) 
TIMELAG  -3.439** 
(-2.080) 
-3.299 
(-1.168) 
-2.393 
(-1.234) 
LOTTODD  -20.835 
(-1.258) 
-5.821 
(-0.283) 
-113.373** 
(-3.624) 
SEO  -43.575** 
(-2.155) 
-28.685 
(-0.791) 
-39.525 
(-1.602) 
UNDWRI  -8.692 
(-0.644) 
-6.735 
(-0.628) 
-2.504 
(-0.151) 
IND  2.062 
(0.099) 
 3.763 
(0.171) 
EXCH  24.256 
(0.880) 
  
BKBDER  0.945** 
(3.192) 
1.099** 
(3.481) 
0.808** 
(2.042) 
PRIRAN  0.098 
(0.436) 
-0.146 
(-0.543) 
0.214 
(0.921) 
PRIADJ  -2.604** 
(-3.454) 
-0.223 
(-0.316) 
-2.556** 
(-3.609) 
SIZEADJ  0.743 
(1.450) 
0.202 
(0.302) 
1.731** 
(2.128) 
No. of observations  182  34  148 
Adjusted-R Square  0.46  0.62  0.44 
 43Figure [1] Average Initial Return and Market-adjusted Initial Return of IPOs 
Figure 1(a) and (b) respectively compare average initial returns (IR) and market-adjusted initial returns 
(MAR) of sample IPOs on Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange through 2001-2007. 
The values in the figures can be traced in Table [3].  
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 44Figure [2] Average Initial Return of IPOs with Positive and Negative Offer Price 
Adjustment on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges 
 
Figure 2 shows a rough relationship of price adjustment and under-pricing. Opposite to 
Hanley (2003)’s finding that initial return is significantly positively correlated with price 
adjustment, IPOs in China have lower average initial return when offer price is adjusted 
downward from preliminary expected price, the mid-value of highest and lowest price 
institutional investors bid in preliminary book-building.  
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